Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to a security element for marking, authenticating, or identifying objects, particularly documents, securities, stamps, labels, bank bills, bank notes, identity documents, personal identity cards, other ID cards, passports, (chip) cards, access cards, credit cards, access control cards, tickets, driver's licenses, vehicle documents, bank notes, checks, postage stamps, labels, vignettes, paintings, art objects, furniture, measuring devices, machine parts, machines, vehicles; cameras, cell phones, computers, computer-like devices, data storage media, printed materials, books, fabric, fashion items and sporting goods, technical devices, tools, paper and cardboard boxes, packaging, as well as products and the like, or living beings such as persons, animals, or plants. The invention relates further to a method for producing a security element of this type, the use thereof for authenticating a person or an object or for authorizing an action, and to a method for labeling, authenticating, or identifying an object or a living being.
Description of the Background Art
Security-relevant objects, such as, e.g., documents, personal identity cards, and passports, as a rule comprise security features with individualized or personalized information, which are to enable an assignment of the object to a specific person. In a simple form, such personalized information is available as image information, e.g., passport photograph, biometric features, or other features such as, e.g., name, address, or date of birth of the person. This information, however, enables an absolutely certain identification of the carrier only conditionally and can be ferreted out or forged with more or less great effort.
To protect against fraud or to make objects forgery-proof, security features are applied or introduced either to or into the object. However, because of the available possibilities for forgery, the absolutely certain assignment of such security elements has remained an unresolved problem thus far.
Security elements of this kind are described, for example, in DE 198 10 134 A1 and DE 3 843 076 A1, EP 1 934 950 A1 (which corresponds to US20090269519), EP 1 748 902 A1 (which corresponds to US20070116937), EP 1 674 286 A1 (which corresponds to US20090127845), EP 1 327 531 A1 (which corresponds to US20050117185), and EP 919 916 B1, and U.S. Pat. No. 6,022,429, U.S. Pat. No. 6,264,296, U.S. Pat. No. 6,685,312, U.S. Pat. No. 6,932,527, U.S. Pat. No. 6,979,141, and U.S. Pat. No. 7,037,013. The U.S. patents mentioned last disclose methods in which ink-jet printing is applied to blanks, the printing which is to be protected with a protective coating or a protective film as protection from mechanical and/or chemical damage and manipulations. The personalized and/or individualized information is stored typographically in the security or value document. Such printed security or value documents, however, provide only some protection from manipulations, because the protective lacquer layer can be easily loosened and/or removed and thus an effect on the printed image is possible. Further, an identical printed image with an identical protective lacquer can be applied to a forgery, as a result of which the forgery can no longer be distinguished from the original. Determination of authenticity is not possible or possible only with great effort.
In DE 10 2008 012 426 A1, which corresponds to US 20110007934, image information for the protection of documents is inserted in at least two layers of the document. The image information contains digital watermark information, whereby only the totality of the digital watermark information in the at least two layers forms a security feature for authenticating the document. This system is not forgery-proof either. The layers can again be produced to be identical or deceptively similar. In addition, the identity cannot be unequivocally assigned to a specific person. False negatives and operator-, user-, or transmission-related errors also continue to be possible.
Another type of security element is described in DE 10 2007 020 982 A1, which makes use of the fact that known visual markings with micro assemblies for a configuration comparison between an original and imitation are based on two- or three-dimensional geometric patterns; these are always realized according to predefined rules, so that imitation of these selectively produced micro assemblies is still possible.
DE 10 2006 015 023 A1, which corresponds to US 20090115185, describes a security element for security papers, value documents, and the like with a diffraction structure, which has an embossed relief structure and a coating layer increasing the security of the diffraction effect of the embossed relief structure. The relief structure is formed based on a cholesteric, liquid crystalline material, and the coating layer contains a reflecting and/or a high-index layer. These methods in principle deal with a combination of the embossed stamp, known since the Middle Ages, with a likewise long-known overlying seal stamp.
DE 10 2005 028 162 A1 describes a security element for the protection of valuable articles with a first and a second authentication feature. The first authentication feature comprises a first arrangement with a plurality of lens-shaped elements, which are present in a raster, and a second arrangement with a plurality of microscopic structures, which are present in a second raster. The first and second arrangements are arranged in this case in such a way that the microscopic structures of the second arrangement, when viewed through the lens-shaped elements of the first arrangement, are to be seen enlarged. The second authentication feature can be examined mechanically and/or visually and is not influenced by the first arrangement of the first authentication feature.
These rasters can also be forged in that the structures are read and accordingly reapplied to a forgery. It must be considered in this case that a forgery needs to convey only the impression of authenticity, therefore could be applied only in one layer, which the combination of both rasters reproduces as they would be read by the reader also in the case of the original. It is sufficient as a result to read an original with a suitable reader to produce this type of forged layer, which would then also be classified as an original by the next original reader.
Regardless of the problem of forgery security, many of the named security elements mention only a limited number of security markings. The security can be increased the more security markings are combined in a security element. This type of approach is described in DE 199 28 060 A1, which corresponds to U.S. Pat. No. 7,301,682. The security element relates to an optically variable security feature for introduction into the paper web of documents, security papers, bank notes, packaging, and products. This deals particularly with holograms in which an electrically conductive marking substance is applied to a supporting film, whereas the reflecting layer contains another marking substance that is detectable by physical means but not perceptible by human vision. At least one electrically conducting polymer and a film-like reflecting layer containing metallic pigments are applied to the supporting film. The diffractive structures are to be embossed in a subsequently cured coating layer. This production process, nevertheless, does not represent protection from copies, because all originals retain their specific security features and these can ultimately be reconstructed.
The aforementioned existing methods for authentication (access control) of persons or for marking of originals are inflexible, on the one hand, because they include predefined authentication steps. On the other hand, they do not include any effective mechanism for protection against forgery. In addition, existing systems are not capable of determining who an authorized person is, because they only compare information that they receive. For example, an ID or access card is compared with data in a database, regardless of whether the ID holder is in fact the authorized person or not. Apart from false-negative cases, false-positive cases are also a daily problem. If, for example, the actual authorized person has forgotten a PIN code or a secret code, then this person is denied access although this involves the correct person. Conversely, a person who is not authorized, for example, can withdraw money at an ATM machine with a stolen debit card with the aid of the secret code, although this person is not authorized to make a withdrawal (false positive). Current systems are based on password-protected, physical, or biometric security features. This type of three-factor authentication is not sufficient, however, because false negatives and other discrepancies can continue to occur. Further, the consistency of the transmitted data is not checked, which enables possible hacker attacks. The identity is cross-checked with non-system relevant factors, which enables system-based errors.
Intelligent systems are intended to make it possible that the authorized person himself has access, when he does not remember the PIN code or secret code, because he can be authenticated based on other non-forgeable features.